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# NEW C.I.A. ESTIMATE FINDS SOVIET SEEKS SUPERIORITY IN ARMS

## INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION 'GRIM'

Somber Assessment Is Attributed  
To Outside Advisers Brought  
Into Study For First Time

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25—President-elect Carter will receive an intelligence estimate of long-range Soviet strategic intentions next month that raises the question whether the Russians are shifting their objectives from rough parity with United States military forces to superiority.

In reporting this, high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next 10 years, just completed, was more somber than any in more than a decade. A top-level military intelligence officer who has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than somber—it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

Previous national estimates of Soviet aims—the supreme products of the intelligence community since 1950—had concluded that the objective was rough parity with United States strategic capabilities.

### Bush: 'Worrisome Signs'

"There are some worrisome signs," George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, said in an interview in characterizing the latest estimate, "and the viewpoints, interpretations and comments on these will be adequately reflected in the estimate."

He said the shift in assessment developed from evidence gathered in the past year and from new interpretations of older evidence that had resulted from "a competitive analysis" in which, for the first time, a team of outsiders analyzed and challenged estimates prepared by the regular intelligence community. As a result some of the governmental analysts changed their assessments.

While Mr. Bush declined to discuss the substance of the estimate, it can be authoritatively reported that the worrisome signs included newly developed guided missiles, a vast program of underground shelters and a continuing buildup of air defenses.

He acknowledged that the 1976 estimate had been prepared amid controversy in the intelligence community, partly induced by the deliberate introduction of the team of outsiders, who were supplied with the same raw material as the estimate team headed by Howard Stoenitz, the Central Intelligence Agency's national intelligence officer on the Soviet Union.

### Upholding Right of Dissent

Mr. Bush, who said the final estimate contained "a full expostulation of the views of the principals," asserted that he had promised to uphold the right of dissent at the outset of his tenure 11 months ago. "I feel I have made good on that," he added.

There have always been officials in the intelligence community who took a grim view of Soviet strategic objectives, but until this year, according to insiders, they constituted a small minority. In the interview Mr. Bush spoke of changed percep-

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